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NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ALIEN INHERITANCE
STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 1962, a resident of Oregon died intestate, leaving
an estate comprised of both real and personal property.' The decedent's
next of kin were nonresident aliens residing in Soviet-occupied East
Germany.2 These relatives, among them the decedent's brother and
sister, instituted a proceeding to determine heirship in their favor.3 The
state of Oregon, through its State Land Board, requested that the
property be escheated to the state.4
An Oregon statute in force at the time provided that the right of
nonresident aliens to take property from Oregon estates depended upon:
(1) the reciprocal right of the citizens of the United States similarly to
take property from estates in the alien's country; (2) the right of citizens
of the United States to receive money in this country originating from
estates in the foreign country; and (3) proof that such aliens would
receive the benefit of money or property from Oregon estates without
confiscation in whole or in part by the foreign country.' Because the
trial court found that the evidence did not establish the existence of
reciprocal rights to take property from or to receive the proceeds of East
German estates at the date of the decedent's death, it ruled that the
proceeds of the estate should escheat to the state of Oregon.6 Upon
appeal, the Oregon supreme court held that the alien relatives of the
decedent were permitted to take the Oregon realty by reason of a 1923
treaty with Germany. 7 The personalty, nevertheless, escheat to the state
of Oregon.8
1. Zschernig v. Miller, 243 Or. 567, 412 P.2d 781, 783, reh'g denied, 415 P.2d 15 (Or.
1966), 389 U.S. 429, reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 974 (1968).
2. 412 P.2d at 783.
3. Id
4. Id
5. Id at 783-84. For the text of the Oregon statute, see infra note 180.
6. Id at 784.
7. Id at 786-93.
8. Id
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In 1968, the United States Supreme Court tested the constitutionality
of Oregon's "Iron Curtain" statute in Zschemig v. Miller.9  The Court
found the statute to be unconstitutional as applied to Zschernig's facts.10
The opinion, however, provided little guidance for lower courts.
Consequently, several states effectively ignored Zschernig, maintaining
statutes similar to Oregon's which remain in force today'
Such statutes, "anachronisms from the Cold War, were aimed at
preventing communist governments from confiscating funds from ameri-
can estates intended for beneficiaries living within those countries."' 2
Alien beneficiaries are forced to prove that favorable political, social and
economic conditions exist in their countries in order to claim their
inheritance. The courts hearing these alien claimant cases evaluate
-and often criticize-the government in control where the claimant
lives. 3 Such judicial evaluation and criticism of foreign governments
improperly enters the field of foreign relations, traditionally an exclusively
federal concern. 4  In addition, courts often narrowly construe these
statutes, thereby restricting the ability of nonresident claimants to receive
their inheritances. Such restrictions implicate both the equal protection
and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment." This Note
examines each of these issues, addressing established arguments, as well
as proposing new arguments, to protect the alien claimant's right to
inherit.16
This Note also examines the deprivation of nonresident alien
beneficiaries in the wake of the Supreme Court's Zschemig decision and
outlines the potentially greater problem facing the United States and its
judicial system due to the increasing frequency with which immigrants
will want to bequeath their property to their relatives in Eastern Europe
or Asia. 7 Finally, a solution must be devised where the intent of the
immigrant decedent is carried out as far as possible, the nonresident alien
beneficiary is not maliciously or unnecessarily deprived of his inheritance
and United States foreign policy interests are observed. This Note, ac-
9. 389 U.S. 429, reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 974 (1968).
10. ld
11. See Comment, Iron Curtain Statutes, Communist China, and the Right to Devise, 32
UCLA L. REv. 643, 643 (1985). For examples of Iron Curtain statutes, see infra notes 48
and 50.
12. Comment, supra note 11, at 643 (citations omitted).
13. Id.; see also infra note 72.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 63-76.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 77-139.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 140-59.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 160-83.
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cordingly, suggests a comprehensive plan to accomplish these goals.
18
II. THE HISTORY OF ALIEN INHERITANCE STATUTES
A. Early European History
The restricted right of aliens to inherit has its roots in antiquity.
Among the Romans, aliens could not hold property except by express
legislation. 19 In this respect, the Romans embraced the custom set by the
Greeks, who excluded foreigners from participation in civil rights and
regarded them as enemies.,' Subsequent European civil law duplicated
Roman law, preventing aliens from taking property by descent or by
operation of law.21
The feudal system that developed after the collapse of Rome also
restricted the right of aliens to inherit land. 2 Landowners wielded great
power, and the military power of the king depended upon having loyal
feudal tenants.? Land was given as a reward for services, and these
services included the necessary requirement of allegiance.24  Hence,
enemy aliens could not inherit land as an heir, and any conveyance or
devise of land to a friendly alien was forfeited to the Crown, at the
king's pleasure. s Furthermore, aliens were not able to succeed to or to
inherit personal property in feudal continental Europe.?6
Unlike the Greek, Roman and medieval law of Europe, England did
not restrict alien succession to personalty.27 Similar to the European
continent, however, the early common law of England did not allow
aliens to take land by descent or operation of law.?8 The origin of this
policy may be traced to the thirteenth century, when England continu-
ally was at war with France.?9 French claimants to land were denied the
18. See infra text accompanying notes 184-97.
19. Comment, Inheritance Rights of NonresidentA liens -A Look at California's Reciprocity
Statute, 3 PAC. Li. 551, 552 (1972).
20. Id
21. Id
22. Id
23. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MA.n.AND, THE. HisrOR OF ENGLISH LAW 459 (2d ed. 1898).
24. Comment, supra note 19, at 552.
25. 1 F. PoU.OcK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 23, at 460-64.
26. Boyd, The Invalidity of State Statutes Governing the Share of Nonresident Aliens in
Decedents' Estates, 51 GEo. LJ. 470, 471 (1963).
27. Id
28. Comment, supra note 19, at 553.
29. Id
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property not because they were aliens per se, but because they were sub-
ject to the power of the king of France. ° No subject of the king of
France would be heard in English courts until Englishmen would be
heard in French courts.3 ' This state of war, however, continued so long
that as time passed this foreign policy restricting subjects of the king of
France became simply the common law rule that any alien would not be
permitted to take real property in England by descent or operation of
law."2
B. American History
When the first English colonists crossed the Atlantic, they carried
this rule in their legal baggage.3 Because the restriction was "a product
of medieval England,"34 it was without relevance in the unsettled wilder-
ness. Nonetheless, it became embedded firmly in American law when the
United States adopted the English common law as it existed at the time
of the American Revolution.3 5  All the changes in American life since
then have not wholly dislodged it.3
The Supreme Court affirmed that these common law disabilities
remained a part of state common law, unless modified 'by statute or
treaty.3 7 Although nearly every state ultimately did modify the common
law rule against alien ownership of real property, the restrictions were
not removed. Instead, as states succumbed to mounting public pressure
against aliens who had become the target of political, economic and
social fears,38 the modifications took the form of restrictions of land
30. Id at 552.
31. Id
32. Id at 553.
33. Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-Evaluation, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15 (1962).
34., Id
35. Comment, supra note 19, at 553.
36. See generally Sullivan, supra note 33.
37. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 602 (1813) (according to
common law a British alien could take only a defeasible title in real property under a will).
38. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 11, at 645, describing public dissatisfaction with British
aliens:
Mounting public pressure against aliens resulted in state legislatures enacting
statutes that restricted land-ownership rights of resident aliens.... During the
1880s and 1890s, an agricultural depression fostered support for the Populist
Party, whose platform included the restriction of landholding by British
aliens.... In fact, this movement to restrict alien landholding swept both major
parties as Republican- and Populist-controlling state legislatures enacted various
statutes aimed at limiting the size and character of alien landholdings.
Id (citations omitted).
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ownership by specific ethnic groups.39 Over time, public agitation shifted
from British to Chinese to Japanese aliens, culminating in 1920 with
California's enactment of the Alien Land Law.40 By 1930, however,
"anti-Japanese legislation receded, partly owing to the depression and
partly to the passage of the 1924 Immigration Act excluding Japanese. 41
C. Recent American History
Anti-Japanese sentiment erupted once again with the outbreak of
World War 11,42 bringing with it legislation not only restricting alien
ownership of land but also, this time, specific legislation restricting
inheritances of both real and personal property by nonresident alien
beneficiaries as well.43 The chief aim of such legislation was "to prevent
Nazi-allied nations from confiscating funds from American estates
intended for beneficiaries living within those nations." 4 Similarly, "the
39. Comment, supra note 19, at 555.
40. Comment, supra note 11, at 645 (citing 1921 Cal. Stat. lxxxiii). The Alien Land Law
prohibited landholding by aliens- whether by operation of law or by operation of the
parties - ineligible for citizenship under the laws of the United States. Id Though neutral
on its face, "the act was aimed at the Japanese since they were the only significant group
of aliens ineligible for citizenship at that time." Id at 645-46. Other states rapidly followed
suit with their own restrictions on ineligible alien landholding. Id at 646; see also Sullivan,
supra note 33, at 3. For an illustration of a case arising out of California's Alien Land
Law, see infra text accompanying notes 122-29.
41. Comment, supra note 11, at 646 (citing Sullivan, supra note 33, at 31).
42. Sullivan, supra note 33, at 34.
43. Comment, supra note 11, at 646 (citing P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 6-7 (1983)).
44. Id An example of such an aim is reflected in the original enactment of CAL. PROB.
CODE §§ 259-259.2 (1941), repealed by 1974 Cal. Stat., ch. 425, § 1. The 1941 statute stated:
Chapter 3. Inheritance Rights of Aliens.
259. The rights of aliens not residing within the United States or its
territories to take either real or personal property or the
proceeds thereof in this State by succession or testamentary
disposition, upon the same terms and conditions as residents and
citizens of the United States is dependent in each case upon the
existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the
United States to take real and personal property and the
proceeds thereof upon the same terms and conditions as residents
and citizens of the respective countries of which such aliens are
inhabitants . . . and upon the rights of citizens of the United
States to receive by payment to them within the United States
or its territories money originating from the estates of persons
dying within such foreign countries.
259.1. The burden shall be upon such nonresident aliens to establish the
fact of reciprocal rights set forth in Section 259.
259.2. If such reciprocal rights are not found to exist and if no heirs
other than such aliens are found eligible to take such property,
the property shall be disposed of as escheated property.
19891
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fear and hatred generated during the Cold War resulted in the same
statutes being applied against communist countries, thereby earning these
statutes the sobriquet, 'Iron Curtain [s]tatutes."'45
In light of the history of these restrictions, it is obvious that the
"Iron Curtain statutes" were a hasty response to what were perceived to
be compelling needs of the moment. "Restrictionism seems to have been
a calculated policy in only a few cases, and most anti-alien legislation
found acceptance only in times of strong public emotion." 6 It may be
argued, therefore, that such waves of public sentiment should not govern
the distribution of estates to innocent beneficiaries. If the national
interest necessitates restrictions, the national legislative body, Congress,
should institute them.
III. CURRENT ALIEN INHERITANCE STATUTES
Currently, ten states restrict inheritances by nonresident alien
beneficiaries. 47 One type of restrictionist statute, the Iron Curtain statute,
Sec. 2. This act is hereby declared to be an urgency measure
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health and safety within the meaning of Section 1 of the
Article IV of the Constitution of the State of California, and
shall take effect immediately. The following is a statement of
the facts constituting such necessity:
A great number of foreign nations are either at war,
preparing for war or under the control and domina-
tion of conquering nations with the result that money
and property left to citizens of California is im-
pounded in such foreign countries or taken by
confiscatory taxes for war uses. Likewise money and
property left to friends and relatives in such foreign
countries by persons dying in California is often never
received by such nonresident aliens but is seized by
these foreign governments and used for war purposes.
Because the foreign governments guilty of these
practices constitute a direct threat to the Government
of the United States, it is immediately necessary that
the property and money of citizens dying in this
country should remain in this country and not be sent
to such foreign countries to be used for the purposes
of waging a war that eventually may be directed
against the Government of the United States.
Reprinted in Comment, supra note 11, at 646 n.30.
45. Comment, supra note 11, at 647.
46. Sullivan, supra note 33, at 34. "[The Revolution, the French war scare of 1798
(which also inspired the Alien and Sedition Acts), the War of 1812, the Populist upheaval,
the anti-Japanese agitation of the 1920s, and the Second World War" are all examples of
such periods of strong public emotion. Id. at 34-35.
47. Nine of the 10 states retain Iron Curtain statutes: Massachusetts (MAsS. GEN. LAws
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may take either of two forms. The "reciprocity" statute conditions the
right of the nonresident alien to inherit upon the reciprocal right of an
American living in the United States to inherit money or property from
a decedent who was a citizen of the country in which the alien claimant
resides. These statutes were enacted in California and other western
states.49  The "benefit, use and control" statute conditions the right to
inherit on whether or not the alien will be entitled to the benefit, use
and control of the property in his own country.50 These statutes were
ANN. ch. 206, §§ 27A, 27B (1958)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-214 (1989));
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 4-107 (1988)); New Jersey (NJ. STAT. § 3B:23-22 (1982)); New
York (N.Y. SUR. Cr. PROC. ACr §§ 2218(1), (2), (3), (4) (McKinney's Supp. 1990)); North
Carolina (N.C. GENt. STAT. §§ 64-3, 64-4, 64-5 (1988)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2113.81 (1976)) and Wyoming (Wyo. STAT. 99 2-4-105, 34-15-101 (1977)) (exception for
personal residence less than or equal to one acre). Mississippi (MIss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23
(1989)) generally prohibits nonresident aliens from inheriting land. New Hampshire retains
the common law prohibition against the inheritance of real property by nonresident aliens.
See In re Constan, 118 N.H. 166, 384 A.2d 495 (1978); see also J. SCHOENBALM, MULTISTATE
AND MULTINATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING 543-64 (1982) (listing state inheritance regulations
regarding aliens' rights).
48. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 64-3, 64-4, 64-5 (1988):
§ 64-3. Nonresident aliens' rights of Inheritance. No Alien residing outside
the United States or its territories shall be entitled to take personal property
located in this State by succession or testamentary disposition if the laws of
the nation of which such alien is a resident prohibit residents of the United
States from inheriting personal property located within that nation. Except
as hereinabove provided, no alien shall, by reason of his citizenship or place
of residence, be disqualified from inheriting property in this State. (1959, c.
1208; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 797, s. 1.)
§ 64-4. Escheats. If a decedent owning personal property located within
North Carolina shall leave no heirs, heirs at law or legatees other than
persons disqualified from inheritance under G.S. 64-3, then such personal
property shall escheat. (1959, c. 1208; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 797, s. 2.)
§ 64-5. Burden of Proof. The burden of proof in any action or proceeding
to disqualify a nonresident alien from taking personal property located within
this State by succession or testamentary disposition by reason of the provision
of G.S. 64-3, shall be upon the person asserting the disqualification. (1959,
c. 1208; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 797, s. 3.)
49. See supra note 47.
50. See, e.g., N.Y. SU. Cr. PRoc. Acr § 2218 (McKinney's Supp. 1990):
1. (a) Where it shall appear that an alien legatee, distributee or bene-
ficiary is domiciled or resident within a country to which checks or
warrants drawn against funds of the United States may not be
transmitted by reason of any executive order, regulation or similar
determination of the United States government or any department
or agency thereof, the court shall direct that the money or property
to which such alien would otherwise be entitled shall be paid into
court for the benefit of said alien or the person or persons who
thereafter may appear to be entitled thereto. The money or property
so paid into court shall be paid out only upon order of the surrogate
or pursuant to the order or judgment of a court of competent
19891
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enacted in New York and other eastern states.5' Both statutes delegate
to the nonresident alien beneficiaries the burden of proving that the
statutory conditions are satisfied by their native countries.52  The simi-
larities between the two statutes, however, end there.
The most important difference is the disposition of the property if
the nonresident alien beneficiary does not meet the requisite burden of
proof. If the alien claimant fails to meet the requirements of proof
under a reciprocity statute, the property escheats to the state in the
absence of other eligible beneficiaries. 3 Under a benefit, use or control
statute, however, the court will impound the property for the benefit of
the alien claimant until she demonstrates that conditions in her country
have changed sufficiently to allow her to enjoy the benefit, use and
control of the property.54 Thus, the reciprocity statute affects the sub-
stantive rights of alien heirs, legatees or devisees, effectuating a complete,
permanent denial of the alien's claim to the property if the requisite
reciprocity is not proved to exist.5" The benefit, use and control statute,
on the other hand, purports to be purely procedural, effectuating only a
jurisdiction.
(b) Any assignment of a fund which is required to be deposited pur-
suant to the provisions of paragraph one (a) of this section shall
not be effective to confer upon the assignee any greater right to the
delivery of the fund than the assignor would otherwise enjoy.
2. Where it shall appear that a beneficiary would not have the benefit
or use or control of the money or other property due him or where
other special circumstances make it desirable that such payment
should be withheld the decree may direct that such money or
property be paid into court for the benefit of the beneficiary or the
person who may thereafter appear entitled thereto. The money or
properly so paid into court shall be paid out only upon order of the
court or pursuant to the order or judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
3. In any such proceeding where it is uncertain that an alien beneficiary
or fiduciary not residing within the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a territory or
possession of the United States would have the benefit or use or
control of the money or property due him the burden of proving that
the alien beneficiary will receive the benefit or use or control of the
money or property due him shall be upon him or the person claiming
from, through or under him.
51. See id.
52. Compare, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 64-4 (1988) ("reciprocity" statute) with N.Y. SU..
Cr. PROC. Acr § 2218(3) (McKinney's Supp. 1990) ("benefit, use and control" statute).
53. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 64-5 (1988) ("reciprocity" statute).
54. See, e.g., N.Y. SUR. Cr. PROC. Acr § 2218(1)(a) (McKinney's Supp. 1990) ("benefit,
use and control" statute).
55. Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and Its Satellites to Share in Estates of
American Decedents, 25 S. CAL. L. REV. 297 (1952).
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temporary denial of the property until the alien proves the requisite
benefit, use and control.56 For this reason, some perceive the benefit, use
and control statute to be a more "enlightened" restriction."
Both statutes have come under increasing attack in recent years, and
deservedly so.58 The constitutionality of these statutes is suspect based
on three different theories. First, the statutes invade the exclusive federal
power over foreign affairs. 9 Second, the statutes burden an alien bene-
ficiary's right to equal protection. 0 Third, the statutes burden the alien
beneficiary's right to due process. 61 These approaches, however, have yet
to persuade the courts of the statutes' unconstitutionality.62
IV. FEDERAL FOREIGN RELATIONS POWER
The conduct of foreign affairs and international relations is an
exclusively federal concern.63 "Our system of government is such that the
56. d
57. Comment, State Reciprocity Statutes and the Inheritance Rights of Nonresident Aliens,
1963 DuKE L.J. 315, 326.
58. See Comment, supra note 11; Comment, supra note 19; Boyd, supra note 26; Sullivan,
supra note 33; Chaitkin, supra note 55; Comment, supra note 57; Rosberg, Discrimination
Against the "Nonresidten" Alien, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 399 (1983).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 63-76.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 77-133.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 134-39.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 160-83.
63. Amarel v. Connell, 202 Cal. App. 3d 137, 142, 248 Cal. Rptr. 276, 281 (1988); see
also Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, 115 11. 2d 221, 225, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307
(1986) ("Disapproval of the political and social policies of a foreign nation does not provide
a valid basis for a tax classification by this State. The State may not exercise its otherwise
wide-ranging taxing power for the purpose of encouraging a boycott of a single nation's
products.")
The power possessed by the Federal government to establish and carry out
foreign policy is plenary and exclusive. . . . The Supreme Court has stated,
'[There are limitations on the sovereignty of the States. No State can rewrite
our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over external
affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government
exclusively.' . . . It has been said that the United States must speak with "one
voice" in its dealings with foreign nations .... The reason for this rule is
self-evident. Were it otherwise, foreign policy initiatives on the part of one State
could embroil the nation as a whole in serious international disputes .... Also,
action by individual States in the field of foreign policy will lead to a lack of
uniformity. Thus, Federal power in the field of foreign relations must be left free
from local interference.
Id at 305-06 (citations omitted). "The broad statement that the federal government can
exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such
implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers is
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs." Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board
1989]
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interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the
people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in
the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local
interference." 64  "A state, even in the exercise of a legitimate state
function, may not proceed in the exercise of that function, by statute or
otherwise, to travel a course that is in conflict with the federal govern-
ment's exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction over foreign policy."'
A state court oversteps its bounds and trespasses upon territory
reserved to the federal executive.., when, for example, it takes
it upon itself to judge a foreign nation's law as just or unjust, or
refuses to recognize as valid the laws and decrees of a foreign
government that has been recognized by the United States.66
of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 223, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802 (1969) (quoting United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936)). "The exclusivity of the
federal government's power in this sphere is predicated upon the 'irrefutable postulate that
though the states were several, their people in respect of foreign affairs were one."' Id at
223 (quoting 299 U.S. at 317).
64. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (foreign policy is a federal concern, not
amenable to state action); see also Bethlehem Steel, 276 Cal. App. 2d at 225, 80 Cal. Rptr.
at 804; South African Airways v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651,
654 (1970).
65. Estate of McDermott, 112 Misc. 2d 308, 309-10, 447 N.Y.S.2d 107, 108 (Sup. Ct.
1982). This fiat was reaffirmed as recently as June 1988, in Amarel v. Connell, 202 Cal.
App. 3d 137, 142-43, 248 Cal. Rptr. 276, 281-82 (1988) (conduct of foreign affairs in
international relations is exclusively federal concern) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Energy
Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983)):
It is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may preempt state
authority by so stating in express terms.. .. Absent explicit pre-emptive language,
Congress' intent to supercede stale law altogether may be found from a "scheme
of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." ... Even where Congress
has not entirely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is
pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a
conflict arises when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility," . . . or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
See also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Reading Co., 654 F. Supp. 1318, 1320, 1330 (Regional
Rail Reorg. Ct. 1987), which held that preemption of a whole field will be inferred where
the field is one in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject .... Although there
is a general presumption against federal preemption, the regulation of foreign affairs is a
paradigmatic "dominant interest," one "intimately blended and intertwined with the
responsibilities of national government." IL at 1331.
66. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 116 Misc. 2d 590, 596, 455 N.Y.S.2d 987, 991
(Sup. Ct. 1982) (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 433, reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 974
(1969), and United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)). For example, the court in
[Vol. 10
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Thus, a state may not enter into independent negotiations or agreements
with other nations about property, probate, or any other matters. "All
such international affairs must be carried on by the federal govern-
ment."67
Commentators often argue, however, that each state traditionally has
enjoyed exclusive control over the ownership and devolution of property
within its borders.68 The foreign relations power, the argument continues,
should not apply to this generally state-regulated area. It is clear,
however, that although matters of inheritance are primarily controlled by
state law, the federal government has long been active in the field:
By means of treaties, the United States has in some instances
provided for inheritance rights which cannot be overridden by
state restrictions or inheritance by nonresident aliens. During
wartime, federal controls on inheritance come into play under
the Trading With the Enemy Act. In states employing the
"benefit" rule the federal government exercises an indirect con-
Bethlehem Steel, 276 Cal. App. 2d at 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 803, struck down the California
Buy American Act as a "usurpation by this state of the power of the federal government
to conduct foreign trade policy." "Such state legislation may bear a particular onus to
foreign nations since it may appear to be the product of selfish provincialism, rather than
an instrument of justifiable policy. It is a type of protectionism which invites retaliative
restrictions on our own trade." Id at 228, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
67. Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate, 60 MtNN. L REv.
621, 646 (1976).
68. E.g., Estate of Fegestad v. Netterblad, 124 Cal. App. 3d 208, 212, 178 Cal. Rptr. 202,
203 (1981) (Court found that the Kingdom of Norway reciprocally provides California
charities with inheritance tax exemptions, within the meaning of California reciprocity
statute.). The Court of Appeal in Fegestad stated:
In establishing exemptions from the California inheritance tax, the legislature is
free to impose any conditions it chooses. . . . mhe right to succession [in
California] is not an inherent or natural right. It is only by virtue of statute that
an heir is given the right to receive any of his ancestor's estate .... Nothing in
-the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature ot a state to limit, condition, or
even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its
jurisdiction.... So broad is the power of the state to determine the devolution
of title to the property ... within its boundaries that it may take the property
itself and deny any right of anyone to succeed thereto either by will or by
succession ....
Id., 248 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82 (citations omitted). But see In re Estate of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d
62, 79, 485 P.2d 785, 796, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433, 444 (1971) (The state has full power to
regulate the matter of the descent and distribution of decedents' estates within its borders
subject to the treaty-making power of the national government, subject to the equal
protection and privilege and immunity guaranties of the United States Constitution and
subject to the exclusive and paramount power of the federal government to deal with
foreign affairs.).
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trol over inheritance in that state courts usually rely on deter-
minations made by the Treasury Department. Thus in legis-
lating on the subject of inheritance by nonresident aliens,
Congress would hardly be invading an area which has heretofore
been reserved exclusively to the states.6
Indeed, it may be argued further that these state-created statutes are
historically inappropriate. "Restrictions on such landholding came into
the common law in aid of the defense of England and as a product of
her foreign policy."70  "[Because] the United States [G]overnment is
constitutionally charged with the conduct of national defense and foreign
affairs, both legal history and constitutional theory justify federal control
of alien land laws." 71
Most importantly, the judicial administration of such statutes involves
inquiries into the types of governments existing in foreign nations. These
inquiries are objectionable because they often entail pejorative criticism
of foreign governments, minute inquiry into the actual administration of
foreign law by a foreign government or inquiry into the rights that such
a government affords to its own citizens, challenge to the veracity of
representations of diplomats and potential diplomatic embarrassment to
the United States.72 For example, while considering the application
of the New York benefit, use and control statute, the court noted (as
did the Supreme Court of the United States in 1968) that the New York
69. Comment, supra note 57, at 325.
70. Note, Conflict Between Local and National Interests in Alien Landholding Restrictions,
16 U. CHi. L. REv. 315, 316 (1949).
71. Id.
72. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 974 (1968). In Zschernig,
the Court held that, as applied, the statute constituted an impermissible intrusion by the
state into foreign affairs, an area that the Court stated was entrusted by the United States
Constitution solely to the President and Congress. Id. at 432. The Court found that the
statute required local probate courts to launch "minute inquiries" into the nature of foreign
governments, the quality of rights which those governments accorded to both American
citizens and their own citizens, the credibility of the representations of officials of foreign
governments and the actual administration of foreign legal systems. Id at 433-35; see also
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M 155 n.55, 629 P.2d 231, 267 n.55
(1980) (citations omitted):
These statutes ha[ve] largely been applied to communist countries. In the years
following their passage, the statutes were subject to widespread criticism by legal
scholars for being unsound legislation which had been both ineffective and
prejudicially applied. ... In applying these statutes, state courts had on occasion
criticized foreign governments in strong and intemperate language. ...
Commentators were virtually unanimous in condemning these statutes and in
applauding the Zschernig decision.
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courts have often made denigrating, evaluative statements concerning the
governments in Eastern Europe. 3 Neither the benefit nor the reciprocity
73. Bjarsch v. DiFalco, 314 F. Supp. 127, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Statutes restricting rights
of alien beneficiaries to receive inheritances from United States citizens do not inherently
constitute intrusion into foreign affairs area, whether such statutes provide for reciprocity
or restrict rights of proposed recipient who would not have benefit, use, or control of
inheritance, but in applying such a statute, the court is limited to a routine reading of a
foreign country's laws, and should not inquire into or evaluate administration of foreign law
or credibility and policies of foreign government.). The Bjarsch court cited the following
statements:
It is a matter of common knowledge that the Communist theory of government
is entirely different than the theory of government operated in the free world.
. .The Communist plan is to dominate and rule the world . .. Marx wanted a
world in which people owned no property, and took orders without question.
The rights of the individual were to be destroyed, and this policy has been
continued and enforced, even to the destruction of the individual in opposition.
1d at 133 n.5 (quoting In re Klein's Estate, 203 Misc. 762, 123 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (Sup. Ct.
1952)). The Bjarsch court also cited In re Getream's Estate, 200 Misc. 543, 107 N.Y.S.2d
225 (Sup. Ct. 1951):
Concededly Hungary is one of the captive countries behind the iron curtain
whose nationals are subject to those conditions of which the western world is
well aware .. .Since Hungary is a member of this bloc of Communist captive
countries, this Court would consider sending money out of this country and into
Hungary tantamount to putting funds within the grasp of the Communists.
Bjarsch, 314 F. Supp. at 134 n.5. And even more biting commentary: "If this money were
turned over to the Russian authorities, it would be used to kill our boys and innocent
people in Southeast Asia .. " Heyman, The Nonresident Alien's Right to Succession Under
the "Iron Curtain Rule," 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 221, 234 (1957-58). "We must not let the
welcomed spirit of detente dull our memories to the fact that the USSR is an oppressive
government which totally subjugates the rights of individuals to the state." In re Estate of
Kolodij, 85 Misc. 946, 951, 380 N.Y.S.2d 610, 615 (Sup. Ct. 1976). The New York courts,
however, are not alone in judicial denigration of Eastern European governments:
In Pennsylvania, a judge stated at the trial of a case involving a Soviet claimant
that "If you want to say that I'm prejudiced, you can, because when it comes to
Communism I'm a bigoted anti-Communist." And another judge exclaimed, "I
am not going to send money to Russia where it can go into making bullets which
may one day be used against my son." A California judge, upon being asked if
he would hear argument on the law, replied, "No, I won't send any money to
Russia." The judge took "judicial notice that Russia kicks the United States in
the teeth all the time," and told counsel for the Soviet claimant that "I would
think your firm would feel it honor bound to withdraw as representing the
Russian government. No American can make it too strong." ... A particularly
pointed attack was made by Judge Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, where he stated with respect to the Pennsylvania Act that: "It is a
commendable and salutory piece of legislation because it provides for the
safekeeping of these funds even with accruing interest, in the steel-bound vaults
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania until such time as the Iron Curtain lifts
or sufficiently cracks to allow honest money to pass through and be honestly
delivered to the persons entitled to them. Otherwise, wages and other monetary
rewards faithfully earned under a free enterprise democratic system could be used
by Communist forces which are committed to the very destruction of that free
enterprising world of democracy." . .. And further. ". . . Yugoslavia, as the
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criteria, moreover, directly confronts the basic question of whether our
national welfare will be prejudiced unduly by permitting assets in the
form of inheritances to flow to foreign countries. 74 Finally, apart from
any consideration of escheat, the state in which an estate is situated has
court below found, is a satellite state where the residents have no individualistic
control over their destiny, fate or pocketbooks, and where their politico-economic
horizon is raised or lowered according to the will, wish or whim of a self-made
dictator." ..."All the known facts of a Sovietized state lead to the irresistible
conclusion that sending American money to a person within the borders of an
Iron Curtain country is like sending a basket of food to Little Red Ridinghood
in care of her 'grandmother.' It could be that the greedy, gluttonous grasp of
the government collector in Yugoslavia does not clutch as rapaciously as his
brother confiscators in Russia, but it is abundantly clear that there is no
assurance upon which an American court can depend that a named Yugoslavian
individual beneficiary of American dollars will have anything left to shelter, clothe
and feed himself once he has paid financial involuntary tribute to the tyranny of
a totalitarian regime." . .. Another example is a concurring opinion by Justice
Doyle in In re Hosova's Estate . .. : "In this year of 1963, the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. issued the following
directive to all of its members. 'We fully stand for the destruction of imperialism
and capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable destruction of capitalism,
but also are doing everything for this to be accomplished by way of the class
struggle, and as soon as possible.'.. . Hence, in affirming this decision the writer
is knowingly contributing financial aid to a Communist monolithic satellite,
fanatically dedicated to the abolishing of the freedom and liberty of the citizens
of this nation .... By reason of self-hypnosis and failure to understand the aims
and objectives of the international Communist conspiracy, in the year 1946,
Montana did not have statutes to estop us from making cash contributions to our
own ultimate destruction as a free nation." ... In Mullart v. State Land Board,
... the court had little difficulty finding that reciprocity existed with Estonia.
But it took pains to observe that in 1941 Russia "moved in and overwhelmed
[Estonia] with its military might. At the same time the Soviet hastily and cruelly
deported about 60,000 of its people to Russia and Siberia and, in addition,
exterminated many of its elderly residents. This policy of destroying or
decimating families and rendering normal economic life chaotic continued long
afterward." . .. Aany effort to communicate with persons in Estonia exposes
such persons to possible death or exile to Siberia. It seems that the Russians
scrutinize all correspondence from friends of Estonians in lands where freedom
prevails and subject the recipient to suspicion of a relationship inimical to the
Soviet .... This line of testimony has the support of reliable historical matter
of which we take notice. We mention it as explaining the futility of attempting,
under the circumstances, to secure more cogent evidence than hearsay in the
matter.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437-440 nn.8-9 (citations omitted). Such commentary has prompted
action on the part of the described country, both in the form of registered complaints and
retaliation. Id at 437 n.7 (Bulgaria's registered complaint); Comment, supra note 11, at 62
n.114 (Japan's enactment of retaliatory laws in response to the states' discriminatory alien
land laws); see also Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1327-28 n.10 (D. Neb. 1971)
(Nebraska statutes providing that no nonresident alien can inherit Nebraska land more than
three miles from corporate limits of any city or town do not constitute an impermissible
interference with federal power over foreign affairs.).
74. Comment, supra note 57, at 324.
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no more interest in preventing assets from reaching the Communist bloc
than does any other state.75 The domestic interest in Communist owner-
ship of United States assets is thus clearly national in scope. It follows,
therefore, that the federal government and not the state governments
should impose controls on inheritance across international boundaries. 76
V. EQUAL PROTECTION IMPLICATIONS
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution prohibits any state from "mak[ing] or enforc[ing] any law
which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."'n It is well established that the equal protection
clause applies to aliens within the territorial jurisdiction of a state. 78 No
case may be cited, however, applying the clause to a nonresident alien. 79
Indeed, it applies only "to any person within its [the state's] jurisdiction,"
and some judicial commentary indicates that it is inapplicable to nonres-
ident aliens. 0 The first unresolved constitutional question, therefore, is
whether a nonresident alien will be deemed "within the state's jurisdic-
tion" as required.8 1
Although the United States Supreme Court has construed the term
"person" to include aliens, it has done so only in cases involving resident
aliens. 2 The Supreme Court in at least one case involving a nonresident
plaintiff referred to the equal protection clause without mentioning the
plaintiffs nonresident status;83 however, the Court has suggested in dicta
75. Id at 325.
76. Id at 325-26.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886); Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d
645 (1969).
79. In re Estate of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 76, 485 P.2d 785, 794, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442
(1971).
80. See Shames v. State of Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1333 (D. Neb. 1971) ("[The
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
has no application to . . . nonresident alien plaintiffs .... "); see also Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950); Cermeno-Cerna v. Farrell, 291 F. Supp. 521, 528
(C.D. Cal. 1968); Moody v. Hagen, 36 N.D. 471, 162 N.W. 704, 706-07 (1917).
81. See Boyd, supra note 26, at 484.
82. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax, 239 U.S. 33; Yick
Wo, 118 U.S. 356; see also Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 485 P.2d 785, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433 (The
court was satisfied that resident aliens were treated the same as citizens and pointed out
that the distinction is residency as opposed to nonresidency.).
83. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946). The plaintiff, who was a nonresident
brought an action in a federal court based on diversity to invalidate a discriminatory state
property tax assessment. In sustaining federal jurisdiction over the state taxing authorities,
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that the clause applies only to persons physically present within the
territorial jurisdiction of the state84
It has been recognized that this territorial construction is too narrow
and arbitrary."' For example, upon the death of the decedent, nonresi-
dent alien claimants succeed to interests in the estate of the decedent
subject to divestment; therefore, it may be argued that the ownership of
such property interests in the state transforms nonresident alien claimants
into persons "within the jurisdiction."8 Clearly, once an alien has
invested in property within a state, that state may obtain in rem (or quasi
in rem) jurisdiction over that person, regardless of whether she is a
resident of the United States.87  Because a state may, consequently,
exercise considerable power over nonresident aliens through these
investment or succession interests, it would be reasonable to define
jurisdiction, for fourteenth amendment purposes, as recognizing this
power.88 Equal protection guarantees, therefore, should apply to all
persons subject to state jurisdiction.89 In the alternative, "jurisdiction"
should be construed as the equivalent of legislative jurisdiction so that in
the case of a nonresident alien, adequate minimum contacts might exist
to satisfy this jurisdictional requirement.90
The second unresolved constitutional issue in applying the equal
protection clause to alien land laws is which standard of review should
be applied -"strict scrutiny" or "deferential review." 91 If the court finds
the Supreme Court referred to the equal protection clause without any accompanying
discussion of the plaintiff's nonresidence. Id at 623.
84. See, e&, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-16 (1981); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S.
197, 216 (1923); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369. The most extensive Supreme Court discussion
of the meaning of the term "within its jurisdiction" comes from Plyler. In Plyler, a class
action suit challenged a Texas law which prohibited the use of state funds to educate the
children of undocumented aliens. 475 U.S. at 215. The state of Texas argued that a class
comprising children of illegal immigrants was not within Texas' jurisdiction for purposes of
the fourteenth amendment because the children were not lawfully in the state. Id. The
Court rejected the state's argument, finding that the Equal Protection Clause was applicable
since the plaintiffs were physically present within the State of Texas. Id Nevertheless, the
Court's reasoning does not clarify whether physical presence within a state is necessary to
trigger the Equal Protection Clause. See Comment, supra note 11, at 663-64 n.122.
85. See Boyd, supra note 26, at 484; see also Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional
Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5-10 (1960);
Note, Property Rights of Aliens under Iowa and Federal Law, 47 IowA L. REv. 105, 114-15
(1961).
86. Horman, 5 Cal. 3d at 75, 485 P.2d at 794, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
87. Note, State Laws Restricting Land Purchases by Aliens: Some Constitutional and Policy
Considerations, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 149 (1982).
88. Id
89. Id.
90. Boyd, supra note 26, at 484; Note, supra note 85, at 115.
91. See, e.g, G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSITUTIONAL LAw
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a "suspect classification," or impairment of a "fundamental right," then
it applies the highest standard of review-strict scrutiny 2 Strict scrutiny
requires a showing that "the classification is necessary to the accomplish-
ment of some permissible state objective." 93 The less rigorous rational
basis standard, applied where the court finds neither a suspect classifica-
tion nor impairment of a fundamental interest, requires only that there
be a "fair and substantial relation" between the classification and the
object of the legislation. 94 The standard of review chosen is thus likely
to determine the outcome of the analysis.95
The strict scrutiny approach generally is applicable to state classifica-
tions based on alienage. 96 Two rationales exist for the proposition that
such classifications, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny:
The first, based squarely on the concepts embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, recognizes that "[alliens
as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
minority . . . for whom heightened judicial solicitude is ap-
propriate." The second, grounded in the Supremacy Clause,
Const. Art. VI § 2, and in the naturalization power, Art. VI § 8,
cl. 4, recognizes the Federal Government's primary responsibility
in the field of immigration and naturalization.97
Nevertheless, in virtually all alien discrimination cases, the Court has
defined the class entitled to heightened judicial protection as "resident
aliens."9 This definition, unfortunately, creates further ambiguities: first,
the Court never has specified a standard of review for statutes that
discriminate against other categories of aliens; and second, as previously
mentioned, the Court never has defined clearly its use of the term
652-67 (1986) [hereinafter G. STONE].
92. Id
93. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); see also Note, supra note 87, at 150.
94. G. STONE, supra note 91, at 435-667.
95. Id.; see also Note, supra note 87, at 150.
96. Moreno v. Toll, 489 F. Supp. 658, 665 (D. Md. 1980) (policy of state university
precluding nonimmigrant aliens from consideration for in-state status whiie enrolled in
university denied equal protection). Id at 660. "The fact that nonimmigrant aliens may not
acquire citizenship in the United States is a fact which is exclusively controlled by Congress.
Therefore, a state has no power to place additional burdens on nonimmigrants solely on
the basis of their visa status as dictated by Congress." Id at 664.
97. Id at 660-61 (quoting Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (1976)).
98. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state restrictions on resident
aliens' eligibility for state welfare benefits violate the equal protection clause).
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resident aliens. 9 The question remains, therefore, whether nonresident
aliens are entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny. If they are, however,
both the reciprocity and the benefit, use, and control statutes would not
pass constitutional muster. In fact, both these statutes, arguably, would
not even pass the rational basis test.
A. Reciprocity Statutes
Proponents of the reciprocity statutes might contend that the purpose
of the statutes is to discourage nonresident alien ownership of property,
both real and personal."° A state may defend this goal by claiming that
the ownership of property by nonresident aliens is undesirable because
of the state's lack of control over nonresident aliens, the undesirability
of absentee ownership or the fear of foreign economic penetration.10' On
the other hand, reciprocity statutes do not prohibit ownership by all
nonresident aliens, but rather only by those whose countries of nationality
fail to permit succession by American nationals.102 In adopting the reci-
procity statute, therefore, the state creates an underinclusive legislative
classification and fails to effectuate this particular goal of discouraging
nonresident alien ownership of property.103
Another possible purpose of a reciprocity statute might be the
promotion of the fundamental principle of American law that the intent
of the decedent should be carried out as far as possible.'04 It certainly
is proper for the legislature to recognize the decedent's desire that his
beneficiaries have the use and enjoyment of their estate shares.t s A
reciprocity statute, however, not only fails to accomplish that end, but it
may impede the testator's intention as well. "Instead of making succes-
sion contingent on the right of a nonresident alien to take and enjoy his
estate share in the country of his residence, the right of succession is
granted only if that country accords American citizens national treatment
in succession matters."' 6 In adopting a reciprocity statute, therefore, the
99. Rosberg, supra note 58, at 401.
100. See Boyd, supra note 26, at 485.
101. 1Id
102. It
103. For a description of "underinclusive" and "overinclusive" legislative classifications,
see G. STONE, supra note 91, at 435-667. This legislative classification is underinclusive,
given the purpose of discouraging nonresident alien ownership by property, in that it fails
to prevent nonresident alien ownership by citizens from countries that grant reciprocal rights
of inheritance.
104. See Boyd, supra note 26, at 485.
105. It at 486.
106. Id
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state creates both underinclusive and overinclusive legislative classifica-
tions and fails to effectuate this goal of promoting the decedent's
intent.107
Arguably, however, neither of the foregoing objectives serves the real
purpose of the reciprocity statutes.'01 Instead, the goal of the reciprocity
statutes either is to discriminate against nonresident aliens or to promote
the right of American citizens to succeed to property abroad by predicat-
ing the succession rights of aliens within a state on reciprocity. 1°9 Both
purposes blatantly involve the foreign relations power of the United
States, and because the states are without power to enact succession
legislation affecting the foreign relations of the United States, 10 these
purposes are improper.
If, in fact, the purpose of the reciprocity statutes is to promote the
right of American citizens to succeed to property abroad, then the means,
clearly, are tailored inadequately to achieve this result. First, unless a
great number of American states adopt reciprocity as a prerequisite for
inheritance by aliens, foreign governments will not feel compelled to
liberalize their inheritance laws to benefit Americans."' Second, it is
impossible for the states to carry on direct negotiations with other
nations."2 Finally, questions of reciprocity usually arise with regard to
communist nations whose laws and institutions are such that technical
107. This legislative classification is underinclusive, given the purpose of promoting the
intent of the decedent, in that it fails to prohibit nonresident alien ownership when the
alien's country does grant Americans reciprocal rights of inheritance, but does not allow its
own citizens the benefit, use or control of the inherited property. The classification is
overinclusive, given the purpose of promoting the intent of the decedent, in that it prohibits
nonresident alien ownership when the alien's country does not grant Americans reciprocal
rights of inheritance, but does allow its own citizens the benefit, use, or control of the
inherited property.
108. See Boyd, supra note 26, at 486.
109. Id
Indeed, the California statute was avowedly enacted in 1941 as a measure to
protect the United States from its potential enemies. The statute was directed
against those nations which impounded or confiscated estate shares belonging to
citizens of California for war purposes. The statute also sought to prevent estate
assets of persons dying in California from being transmitted to aliens residing in
hostile foreign nations where the assets might be confiscated and used for war.
Since the foreign countries which engaged in these acts were hostile to the
United States, it was considered essential that assets in this country should not
be sent abroad where they could be utilized in a war against the United States.
Id
110. See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
111. See Note, Alien Inheritance Statutes: An Eramination of the Constitutionality of State
Laws Restricting the Rights of Nonresident Aliens to Inherit from American Decedents, 25
SYRACUSE L. REv. 597, 601 (1974); Comment, supra note 57, at 319.
112. See Comment, supra note 57, at 319; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936).
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reciprocity would be of no great benefit to residents of their country."'
Thus, there is no "rational relation" between the "promotion of Ameri-
can rights" purpose of the reciprocity statutes and the means chosen to
effectuate that purpose.
B. Benefit, Use and Control Statutes
Although the more liberal benefit, use and control statutes in theory
should not fare as poorly as the reciprocity statutes in the "improper
purpose" test, they fail as well. These statutes are designed to preserve
rather than to confiscate the distributee's shares by authorizing the
probate court to withhold estate shares of beneficiaries residing in
countries where they are unlikely to realize fully the benefits of their
shares in either a testate or intestate estate in the United States.114
Where the reciprocity statutes fail to effectuate the decedent's intent that
his beneficiaries should have the benefit of their estate shares, the
benefit, use and control statutes at least in theory accomplish this goal.
In reality, however, benefit, use and control statutes "amount to a
'discriminatory practice' that 'sometimes takes the form of a manifesta-
tion of cold war."'11 5
Moreover, benefit, use and control statutes, "which appear to be
concerned solely with effectuating the testator's intentions, have the same
effect and underlying purpose as 'reciprocity' statutes. They, too, are
designed to prevent the sending of money and property to countries
behind the 'Iron Curtain.'1 1 6 Thus, benefit, use and control statutes also
implicate the foreign relations power of the United States.
113. See Comment, supra note 57, at 319. The right of United States citizens to receive
money from estates left in foreign nations means little if the laws of that nation discourage
or forbid the accumulation of estates from private property. Id; see also Note, Estates and
the "Iron Curtain," MAss. L.Q., May 1950, at 34.
114. Boyd, supra note 26, at 487.
115. Comment, supra note 11, at 662 (quoting Berman, supra note 72, at 272).
116. Note, supra note 111, at 601-02. The reason advanced for enacting the first of
these statutes in New York was the possibility that the distributive shares paid to
nonresident aliens might be confiscated by the countries of their residence:
This amendment is proposed by the Executive Committee of the Surrogates'
Association of the State of New York. The purpose of the amendment is to
authorize the deposit of monies or property in the Surrogate's Court in cases
where transmission or payment to a beneficiary, legatee, or other person resident
in a foreign country might be circumvented by confiscation in whole or in part.
The amendment authorizes the impounding of the fund by the Surrogate to await
the time when payment can be made to the beneficiary for his own benefit, use
and control.
Boyd, supra note 26, at 488 n.77 (quoting SvR. CT. AeT, 13B N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 155 (ed.
notes) (1953)).
[Vol. 10
ALIEN INHERITANCE STATUTES
C. Alternative Equal Protection Arguments
Because the states are without power to enact succession legislation
affecting the foreign relations power of the United States,"7 the purpose
of the benefit, use and control statutes also is improper. Neither of
these two types of statutes, therefore, would seem to survive an equal
protection attack -even when a low standard of review is applied.
Courts have avoided the problem of unclear standards of review and
possible jurisdictional limitations, however, and have ruled out equal
protection arguments against these restrictive alien inheritance statutes.
18
Instead, the courts focus on the exclusive federal control over foreign
relations argument.119 It is possible, however, to formulate equal
protection arguments from an alternate perspective that may persuade
the courts that these restrictive statutes contravene the equal protection
clause.
For example, it may be argued that the Iron Curtain statutes
distinguish in a discriminatory fashion between nonresident aliens of one
country and nonresident aliens of another country. 2° An even stronger
117. See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
118. See, eg., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 974 (1968).
119. See, eg., id Arguably, by limiting its holding to a federal exclusivity ground, the
Court in Zschernig made it possible for state courts to find that their reciprocity probate
provision does not involve the state in "an evaluation, either expressed or implied, of the
administration of foreign law, the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, and the
policies of foreign governments," or any other matter condemned by Zschernig. Id at 442;
see, e.g., In re Estate of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 485 P.2d 785, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1971).
States may, in effect, freely discriminate against nonresident aliens, as long as they don't
evaluate foreign law, administration of foreign law, or credibility of foreign governmental
officials. Such discrimination, however, clearly has the potential to damage foreign relations
when the discriminated-against countries find their citizens unjustifiably denied their
American inheritances. Thus, basing the Court's decision in Zschernig on the federal
exclusivity ground ignores the potential effect of state control over foreign inheritance on
foreign relations. For further discussion, see supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
120. For example, the New York surrogate court, under the state's Iron Curtain statute
refused to give effect to a Czechoslovakian beneficiary's voluntary assignment of her estate
for lack of proof of benefit, use, and control in Czechoslovakia. Comment, supra note 11,
at 665 n.28; In re Marek, 11 N.Y.2d 740,181 N.E.2d 456, 226 N.Y.S.2d 444, appeal dismissed
sub nom, Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30 (1962). The petitioner-assignee was a resident
of the United Kingdom and contended that such proof was unnecessary because ihe funds
would not be going to Czechoslovakia. Comment, supra note 11, at 665 n. 2 8 ; Marek, 11
N.Y.2d at 740, 181 N.E.2d at 456, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 444. The petitioner argued that the
assignor and assignee were not accorded the same treatment as estate beneficiaries residing
in other countries who were permitted to assign their shares voluntarily, even though such
beneficiaries had no greater freedom of disposition than persons residing in Czechoslovakia.
Comment, supra note 11, at 665 n.128 (quoting Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 4-5,
16-20, Ioannou, 371 U.S. 30). The petitioner in effect argued that such discrimination
among nonresident aliens violated equal protection. The Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal for want of a substantial federal question. Ioannou, 371 U.S. at 30.
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argument, however, contends that these restrictive statutes deny American
decedents of their constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws:
Common sense suggests, and intestacy laws presume, that the
decedent will leave his estate to his spouse and close relations
.... It appears equally commonsensical that if the decedent's
spouse or close relations are nationals in a foreign country, the
decedent likely originated from that country. Assuming the
validity of these two hypotheses, the Iron Curtain Statutes, which
burden the inheritance rights of nationals from certain countries,
must then also burden the rights of American citizens and
residents to devise property on the basis of their national origin.
The Supreme Court has treated discrimination based on national
origin the same as racial discrimination. . . . Accordingly, the
Iron Curtain statutes should be subject to strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause and as a result, should be in-
validated.'2'
The Supreme Court in effect has expressed receptiveness to such an
argument. The Court, in considering the constitutionality of a state law,
was confronted with an analogous situation where two alternate equal
protection perspectives existed.'2 California's Alien Land Law, which
precluded aliens ineligible for American citizenship from acquiring or
transferring agricultural land, was patently aimed at the Japanese.'2 3 An
intent to avoid the statute would be presumed if land held in the name
of a citizen or eligible alien had been purchased by a Japanese alien, and
the burden of proof was on the alien. 14
A Japanese resident alien paid for two parcels of agricultural land
which he transferred to his son, an American citizen.' 2s The father then
petitioned to be appointed his son's guardian for the purpose of
managing the land now owned by his son.'26 While the son was interned
during World War II, the state of California filed a petition to declare
an escheat of his land, alleging that it was acquired with intent to avoid
121. Comment, supra note 11, at 685 (citations omitted); see, e&, Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 (1954) (discrimination against Mexican-Americans in jury selection violates the
equal protection clause).
122. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
123. Comment, supra note 11, at 685.
124. Id. (citing Oyama, 332 U.S. at 636).
125. Id. (discussing Oyarna, 332 U.S. at 636-37).
126. Id.
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the Alien Land Law.127 The Supreme Court viewed the statute from the
perspective of the son, holding that the Alien Land Law, when applied
in this case, deprived the landholder of the equal protection of the law.
128
The Court further reasoned that the Civil Rights Act, enacted prior to,
but supported by, the fourteenth amendment, had accorded to all citizens
the right to take and hold real property, and to inherit and convey real
or personal property. 29
The Alien Land Law bears a striking resemblance to the Iron
Curtain statutes. Both are neutral on their face, yet both are enforced
against particular nationalities1 30 under both statutes, the burden of proof
s on the alien.13 1 The Court's decision, therefore, suggests that the
reciprocity and benefit, use and control statutes are vulnerable to an
equal protection attack. Because it would be anomalous for the Civil
Rights Act to protect the right to inherit and not the right to devise,
American citizens originating from Iron Curtain nations should have the
right to convey or devise real and personal property.A2  Any dis-
criminatory burden on that right requires a compelling justification.133
VI. DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS
The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution are not restricted specifically to persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States. Constitutional terminology, therefore,
permits the application of these clauses to nonresident as well as resident
aliens.134 Nonresident status ,however, has been used to justify fewer
procedural protections. 35 It has been argued, in response
127. Id. (discussing Oyama, 332 U.S. at 637).
128. Id. (discussing Oyama, 332 U.S. at 633).
129. Id. (discussing Qyama, 332 U.S. at 640).
130. Comment, supra note 11, at 685.
131. Id
132. See id at 685-86.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
134. In Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), the Court stated generally by dictum
that the fourteenth amendment "extends to aliens." Id at 411. Because the only alien
defendant was a nonresident Mexican corporation, the Court clearly had in mind
nonresident aliens. Id. at 402; see also Boyd, supra note 26, at 481-82.
135. See, e.g, In re Estate of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 77, 485 P.2d 785, 795, 95 Cal. Rptr.
433, 443 (1971) (citations omitted):
Citizens and resident aliens are likely to have substantial contacts and relation-
ships with the state, directly or indirectly through the national government or
other state governments, that nonresident aliens lack.... In recognition of these
connections and relationships, it is not unreasonable that the state should defer
its power of escheat as to resident aliens and citizens for a longer period than
as to nonresident aliens.
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[that] for purposes of standing, there is no logical basis for
asserting that the words [of the due process clause] do not mean
precisely what they say, and therefore a nonresident, friendly
alien alleging a deprivation of his property which is located
within the territorial boundaries of this country would have
standing to raise the due process argument.' 6
But see Moreno v. Toll, 489 F. Supp. 658 (D. Md. 1980). "Citizens and immigrant aliens
do not necessarily have a 'closer affinity' to the State than do nonimmigrant aliens." Id
at 666. "Nonimmigrant aliens ... have a lesser degree of national affinity than immigrant
aliens since the former will not, as a matter of course, become eligible for citizenship.
This fact, however, is an insufficient justification for allowing the states greater latitude to
discriminate against nonimmigrant aliens." Id at 663. Moreover, because of their
remoteness, nonresident aliens arguably should be accorded a longer period of time in
which to appear. See Hornan, 5 Cal. 3d at 79, 485 P.2d at 797, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 445, where
the court acknowledges that this proposition is "not without logic," but then further reasons
that it is this remoteness that illustrates the lack of contacts with the state which justify
favoring residents over nonresident aliens. In fact, the court compares nonresident aliens
with persons missing or unknown, for whom employment of an indirect and even a probably
futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar
to a final decree foreclosing their rights.
136. Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1338 (D. Neb. 1971) (Van Pelt, J.,
dissenting) (The plaintiffs argued that the reciprocity statute in question deprived the
decedent of his right to dispose of his property as he sees fit, denying his liberty without
due process of law.). Judge Van Pelt further argued that the case that stands for the
proposition that residing in this country entitles an alien to invoke the protection of the due
process and equal protection clauses
[may not] . . . be cited for the proposition that residing outside the territorial
boundaries prohibits an alien from invoking the protection of the due process
clause when the alien has allegedly been deprived of his property located within
the boundaries of this country .... I feel constrained to reject the proposition
that aliens outside of the United States are not entitled to the protection of the
due process clause if they have property in this country.
Id at 1338-39. Judge Van Pelt also quotes, as substantiation, Judge Friendly:.
The Government's second answer that "[t]he Constitution of the United States
confers no rights on non-resident aliens' is so patently erroneous in a case
involving property in the United States that we are surprised it was made.
Throughout our history the guarantees of the Constitution have been considered
applicable to all actions of the Government within our borders - and even to
some without .... This country's present economic position is due in no small
part to European investors who placed their funds at risk in its development,
rightly believing they were protected by constitutional guarantees; today, for other
reasons, we are still eager to attract foreign funds. In Russian Volunteer Fleet
v. United States, ... the Court squarely held that an alien friend is entitled to
the protection of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of taking without just
compensation- even when his government was no longer recognized by this
country. And the Court has declared unequivocally, with respect to non-resident
aliens owning property within the United States, that they 'as well as citizens are
entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment.' . . . It does not follow,
however, that in dealing with the property of an alien the United States must be
blind to the acts of the country of which he is a national; the Constitution
protects the alien from arbitrary action by our government but not from
reasonable response to such action by his own."
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Thus, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment may apply
to nonresident aliens. The protection it provides, however, poses an
entirely different question. For example, state alien land laws may be
classified as economic regulations, and
[s]ince the abandonment of the substantive due process doctrine
the Supreme Court has applied an extremely deferential standard
of review to state economic regulation. The state need only
show that the law in question has a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest for the law to be considered constitution-
al. State alien land laws could be said to bear a rational relation
to a state interest since they are neither arbitrary nor capricious.
The issue, then, is whether the state interest in regulating alien
landholding is sufficiently legitimate to withstand deferential due
process scrutiny. . . . Unless the regulations are found to go
beyond mere economic regulation and to touch on some
"fundamental right" of aliens, it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court would declare state alien land laws unconstitutional on due
process grounds. No state economic regulation has been struck
down on substantive due process grounds since 1937.137
Even if the Iron Curtain statutes are classified as economic regula-
tions (and consequently, the protection provided by the due process
clause is minimal), a second important effect of the clause is implicated.
Because it incorporates the fifth amendment's obligation to provide
Id at 1339 (quoting Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106, 111 (2d
Cir. 1966) (citations omitted)). Moreover, the argument that the nonresident alien has no
property in the state also fails because it presupposes the constitutional validity of the very
statutes under attack. Id at 1340. While the general presumption that a legislative
enactment is constitutional is permissible, it should not be "raised as an impenetrable shield
to foreclose an attack on constitutional grounds. To do so . . . forces the proponent of
such an argument to advocate or engage in circuitous reasoning, and forces everyone else
into a game of semantics." Id Finally, Judge Fuld stated:
I cannot discount the precise language of the due process clause and its logic.
It commands with unmistakable clarity that no state shall deny any person the
iight to due process of law. The right is not limited solely to citizens or
residents. Physical location or presence is not designated a ground for
distinguishing between those who are entitled to its protection and those who are
not, when there is some basis upon which the judiciary may act.
Id
137. Note, supra note 87, at 147 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), in which the Court rejected a due process challenge to
a federal prohibition of the interstate shipment of "filled milk" and applied a rational basis
test. The Court went even further in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955), declaring that "[t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause...
to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."
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compensation for a taking of property for public use, the due process
clause might serve as the basis for a claim to compensation from the
state where alien land laws permit escheat.m The Constitution assures
the alien a large measure of equal economic opportunity; she may invoke
the writ of habeas corpus to protect her personal liberty; in criminal
proceedings against her she must be accorded the protections of the fifth
and sixth amendments; and, unless she is an enemy alien, her property
may not be taken without just compensation. 13 9 The nonresident alien
beneficiary attacking the benefit, use and control or reciprocity statute,
therefore, might also claim that the court's impoundment of devised
property effects a "taking" for which compensation is due.
VII. PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS
In addition to constitutional arguments against these restrictive
statutes, criticism grounded in the practicalities of their operation is
warranted. For example, the factors militating against a party who
wishes to show that a foreign nation grants reciprocal rights of in-
heritance are considerable:
Most reciprocity statutes place the burden of going forward with
evidence as well as the burden of persuasion on the party
seeking to establish the reciprocal right. In the absence of
competent evidence to the contrary, reciprocity is assumed not
to exist. Thus if the foreign claimant is unable to find any law
one way or the other, he loses his case.140
138. See Note, supra note 87, at 147.
139. Shames, 323 F. Supp. at 1344 (Van Pelt, J., dissenting) ("The proper reading of the
legislative history of the escheat provisions indicates that the intent was to provide
compensation to those persons who would have been entitled to the land.").
140. Comment, supra note 57, at 320; see also In re Estate of Kasula, 456 Pa. 62, 318
A.2d 338 (1974) (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that burden of proving heirship rests
with claimant). "[Tihe evidence must be so clear, precise, and definite in quality and
quantity as to satisfy the court below that the relationship claimed existed." Id. at 66; 318
A.2d at 340 (quoting Link's Estate (No.1), 319 Pa. 513, 522-23, 180 A. 1, 5 (1935)); see also
In re Johnston, where the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that if the nonresident
alien fails to prove by the greater weight of the evidence the existence of the law providing
for such reciprocal rights, he will not be entitled to share in the estate. 16 N.C. App. 38,
190 S.E.2d 879, 883 (1972) (statute providing that right of nonresident aliens to inherit
property is dependent upon reciprocity is constitutional on its face); In re DeSautels, where
the Massachusetts Appeals Court rejected claims made to receive the distributive shares of
citizens of Poland when they were based solely on the strength of a power of attorney
purportedly executed by the heirs in Poland and authenticated by Russian authorities. 1
Mass. App. Ct. 787, 307 N.E.2d 576, 581 (1974) (the burden rests upon those asserting that
they are entitled to share in an estate to prove their contention). The court stated that
"the recitals in the power of attorney and in the petitions before us are but self-serving
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Perhaps even more fundamental a burden on the claimant is judicial
intolerance of the foreign claimant's power of attorney which usually is
his only vehicle for advancing his interests.t4 ' Moreover,
statements.... " Id at 581 (quoting Danilovitch, 322 Mass. 283, 285-86, 76 N.E.2d 759, 761
(1948)). For criticism of these judicial stances, see In re Estate of Krepinevich, 433 Pa. 78,
248 A.2d 844, 845 (1969) (O'Brien, J., dissenting) (In order to establish that she is surviving
widow and sole heir of decedent's estate, claimant must prove (1) that she is decedent's
widow and (2) that decedent was not survived by any issue, parent, brother, sister, child of
brother or sister, grandparent, uncle or aunt.). Judge O'Brien stated as to the burden of
proof upon claimant:
I can see no reason whatsoever for placing this burden [to prove the nonexis-
tence of any surviving issue, parent, brother, sister, child of brother or sister,
grandparent, uncle or aunt] on appellant. It is in accordance with no sensible
theory of allocation of the burden of proof. It requires appellant to prove a
negative. It requires her to prove facts about which she may have no way of
knowing. If it be replied that the Commonwealth likewise has no means of
knowing these facts, the absurdity of the majority position becomes manifest....
[Because] appellant has proved that she is the widow, and [because] there are no
other relatives claiming as heirs, I would award appellant the entire estate.
I at 87-88; 248 A.2d at 848.
141. Kasula, 456 Pa. 62, 318 A.2d 338 (foreign power of attorney showing only that
persons purporting to be decedent's children appeared before notary, asserted their claims
of kinship, and in his presence executed document was insufficient to establish either
existence of any children in Soviet Union or affiants' identity as decedent's heirs). The
dissenting justice criticized the majority's conclusion, pointing out that the claimant's power
of attorney, while not acknowledged immediately before a United States consular officer,
was duly authenticated in full compliance with the applicable statutes of the Commonwealth.
Id at 75, 318 A.2d at 345 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). The applicable statutory provision
provided that "the acknowledgment of any instrument may be made without the United
States before ... (2) a notary public of the country where the acknowledgment is made."
Id. at 75 n.9, 318 A.2d at 345 n.9 (citing The Act of April 27, 1876, P.L. 49, § 1, 28 P.S. §
223, and the Uniform Acknowledgment Act, Act of July 24, 1941, P.L. 490, as amended, 21
P.S. § 291.1 et seq., quoting 21 P.S. § 291.4). The dissenting justice further pointed out:
For us to refuse to recognize the authority of the power of attorney.. . seems
to ... be in practical effect as much an unjustified intrusion into the area of
foreign affairs as was the Iron Curtain Act itself. Certainly most persons living
abroad who have need to execute a power of attorney for use in this country will
not find it possible or feasible ... to do so before a United States consul. They
may well live in remote areas and be of modest means; there is no reason why
-they should have to travel to a city where we maintain a consulate. Our
legislation was adopted for the very purpose of allowing recognition and credit
to be extended to acts of notaries public of other countries. The invidious
distinction now perpetrated by the court is a vestigial remnant of the "Cold War"
attitude so prevalent in the post-World War II period .... It is out of place in
today's world.
Id at 77, 318 A.2d at 346 (citations omitted). Generally, the acknowledgment must be
made before a consul of the United States who must certify that he personally knows the
individuals who present themselves for the document to be of significant probative value in
determining the identity of the acknowledgers. In re Estate of Demczuk, 444 Pa. 212, 282
A.2d 700 (1971). Clearly, this requirement disadvantages those foreign claimants who are
not fortunate to have befriended a consul of the United States. Yet, often, even a power
of attorney and a certificate of acknowledgment executed by the United States Consul in
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[elven if the claimant is able to introduce evidence of treaties or
laws which purport to guarantee a reciprocal right on the part
of United States citizens to inherit, the case is not necessarily
settled. It may be necessary to prove that the law or treaty was
in effect at the time of the decedent's death or that the foreign
government actually observes the law on its books. Where the
statute requires that foreign inheritances be receivable in full in
this country, questions of monetary and exchange controls may
be brought into the suit.142
Indeed, the issue of timing -whether "the law or treaty was in effect
at the time of the decedent's death" -may lead to absurd results. For
example, a reciprocity or benefit, use and control statute may exist at the
time of death when a country might be friendly, but not at the time of
distribution when the country might be unfriendly. The existence of
reciprocity or benefit, use and control at the time of death is controlling;
thus, it is possible to have an alien, residing in an unfriendly nation at
the time of distribution, inherit the devised property 43 Likewise, it is
possible for an alien, residing in a friendly country at the time of
the foreign country are alone insufficient. In Demczuk, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that while a power of attorney, certificate of acknowledgement executed by the United
States Consul in Moscow, affidavits from community and former community members,
copies of parents' marriage certificates, mother's death certificate and affidavit by a resident
of New York allegedly fluent in Ukrainian Dialect viewed separately might not establish
claimant's identity beyond a reasonable doubt, in the aggregate they are sufficient to satisfy
the requisite burden so that he may now take under the will. Id. at 219-21, 282 A2d at
704-05. Sometimes, however, even this prolific arsenal of documentary proof is insufficient
to allow the foreign claimant to prevail in his claim. In re Estate of Kolodij, 85 Misc. 2d
946, 954, 380 N.Y.S.2d 610, 617 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (The nonresident alien who supports her
claim solely by means of documentary proof, is not subject to cross-examination by
respondent's attorney and thus is accorded preferential treatment; therefore, in the interests
of justice and fair play, the Court did not grant the national's application.).
142. Comment, supra note 57, at 320; see also In re DeSautels, 1 Mass. App. Div. 787,
307 N.E.2d 576, 582 (1974) (exaction of a fee of a little less than a third by Russian
attorneys for a largely ministerial function of transmitting distributive shares would be
unconscionable). "It would hardly be in the interests of justice were the court to find ...
that their inheritances could be transmitted to the Lithuanian heirs in 'substantially full
value,' while tolerating an unwarranted diminution in their inheritances through excessive
fees to those who would represent them." Id., 307 N.E.2d at 582; In re Wells' Estate, 204
Misc. 975, 126 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sur. Ct. 1953) (where it appeared that foreign rate of
exchange would result in confiscation of greater part of inheritance, and beneficiaries were
permitted to spend balance only for purchases at excessive prices, or were permitted to save
it only at risk of losing it, inheritance should be retained by executors for benefit of
beneficiaries). But see In re Estate of Kish, 52 NJ. 454, 246 A.2d 1, 9 (1968) (holding that
benefit, use and control existed in Hungary, looking at foreign exchange controls and the
black market). "We do not think that the rate of exchange of dollars for local currency
is ordinarily an appropriate consideration under Zschernig." id. at 469, 246 A2d at 9.
143. Comment, supra note 19, at 565.
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distribution to be denied his inheritance because there was no reciprocity
at the time of death. 14 Moreover, when "questions of monetary and
exchange controls are brought into the suit," they too may be control-
ling.1 5 For example, if the local exchange rate with communist countries
is deemed confiscatory, some courts find a lack of benefit, use and
control because the alien beneficiary receives a fraction of the actual
value of the dollar, with the remainder being confiscated by the state.
146
Even in cases where reciprocity or benefit, use and control unques-
tionably exists, the foreign claimant may find it difficult to prove its
existence. Questions of foreign law are treated as questions of fact, and
a finding as to the foreign law - like any other finding of fact - will be
sustained on appeal if there is any evidence to support it."47  Thus, an
erroneous finding is not subject to successful appeal unless contrary to
the weight of evidence in the record. 148 The net result of this process is
that final outcomes diverge widely under similar fact situations, and
precedent becomes meaningless. 49 Indeed, there may be two judgments,
both invulnerable on appeal, which make diametrically opposed declara-
tions with respect to the identical country and the identical time
period. 50
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Wells, 204 Misc. at 983, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 449 (Hungarian and Czechoslovakian
beneficiaries would not receive the benefit, use, and control of the proceeds of their
inheritances because of confiscatory exchange rates); In re Mazurowski, 331 Mass. 33, 39-41,
116 N.E.2d 854, 858-59 (1954) (same holding regarding Polish beneficiaries). As one
commentator noted:
There are several ways of measuring the comparative value of exchange, and
these different methods may distort a court's perception of the value of what is
received. For example, the free market value of the Soviet ruble or the Chinese
renminbi may be much lower than the official exchange rate because each
currency is internal and may only be used in its respective country. In addition,
a value measured by the purchasing power of the currency depends upon what
is being purchased. Thus, luxury items purchased cheaply in America may be
extremely expensive in Communist countries. On the other hand, necessities such
as food, clothing, and shelter may be much cheaper in Communist countries. For
example, the People's Republic of China has adopted a policy of price control
and government subsidy to stabilize consumer good prices.
Comment, supra note 11, at 654.
147. Goldentrester v. Richard 498 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (whether
the bequest to the beneficiaries is capable of consummation in accordance with the
testator's intent is a question of fact).
148. Chaitkin, supra note 55, at 310-11; Comment, supra note 57, at 320-21.
149. Chaitkin, supra note 55, at 310-11; Comment, supra note 57, at 320-21.
150. Chaitkin, supra note 55, at 310-11; Comment, supra note 57, at 32-21; see, e.g,
Goldenutster, 498 So. 2d at 1306 ("The trustees' determination, that the gift to the Soviet
beneficiaries is impossible or impractical, unjustifiably frustrates the testator's intent."). In
Goldentrester, counsel for the claimant presented a letter from a Consular Affairs Officer
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Many states have made general provisions for judicial notice of the
laws of foreign countries 51 Consequently, the foreign claimant may have
to present "persons qualified as experts in the foreign law, publications
which are recognized in the foreign court as evidence of the written
foreign law, or authenticated copies of such law."1 2 If translation is
necessary, an expert must be secured for this purpose."'
California attempted to mitigate these burdens of proof, allowing the
courts to require no more than a demonstration that the law of a foreign
country, as written and applied, enables California citizens to inherit on
terms of full equality with that country's residents.15 4 Even with this
relaxed standard of proof, however, a greater problem of expense exists
in proving either reciprocity or benefit, use and control.'"1 Indeed, the
in the State Department, that concluded that there is a reasonable assurance that Soviet
and Baltic beneficiaries of American estates will receive their inheritance proceeds and be
able to negotiate them for full official value. 498 So. 2d at 1305. Counsel also presented
the opinion of Harvard Law School Professor Berman, a proclaimed expert in Soviet law,
concluding that the laws of the USSR place no restrictions on the rights of a Soviet citizen
to inherit property from a foreign decedent. Id A partner in the law firm representing the
claimants gave the following statements by affidavit:
I know from extensive experience that Soviet legatees or distributees of estates
in the United States can and regularly do receive their inheritances through funds
transmitted by my firm acting as attorneys-in-fact for such legatees and
distributees, [because] we obtain receipts signed by our clients in all cases. No
complaint of nonreceipt has been made. I have personally spoken to clients in
the Soviet Union who received or are to receive inheritances and I have
confirmed with them the prices they pay for merchandise and the availability of
goods to them.
Id Counsel for the estate, however, countered this evidence by claiming that no United
States Federal Agency has been able to obtain any information as to whether any
testamentary beneficiaries in the Soviet Union ever receive any devise left to them in an
estate in the United States. Id Furthermore, they asserted that there is no way to
determine whether the photocopy signatures of reported Soviet beneficiaries on "receipts"
are genuine; Professor Berman might have obtained little factual information from Soviet
beneficiaries ("it is probable that if the Professor did talk to beneficiaries, he was surely
accompanied by members of Inyurkollegia [an official arm of Soviet government composed
of lawyers] and/or a Soviet government 'guide."'); bequests to Soviet citizens are
substantially diminished by attorney fees, the exchange rate, and issuance of "coupons"
instead of rubles, which can be redeemed only at certain government stores. Id at 1305-06
Thus, two seemingly valid arguments are proposed, each diametrically opposed to the other.
Few controls exist to prevent courts from adopting either one.
151. Comment, supra note 57, at 321; see, e-g, In re Johnston, 16 N.C. App. 38, 190
S.E.2d 879 (1972) (courts will take judicial notice of the laws of foreign countries).
Remember, too, the California judge who took "judicial notice that Russia kicks the United
States in the teeth all the time." Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 n.8, reh'g denied, 390
U.S. 974 (1968).
152. Comment, supra note 57, at 321.
153. Id
154. Comment, supra note 19, at 564.
155. Id
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requirements of reciprocity or benefit, use and control may disinherit
more often than intended, simply because the potential inheritance is not
sufficiently large to warrant the expenditure necessary to establish that
these requirements do exist.1 16 One commentator even went so far as to
state that "it seems as if all [these statutes] really [do] is cause hardship
to innocent [nonresident] relatives."" 7
The most ominous aspect of the Iron Curtain statutes is not their
confiscatory effect in the past, but their vast potential for harm in the
near future. For example, one source of conflict may arise from the
significant numbers of aged Eastern European, as well as Asian,
immigrants:
These immigrants have, as a regular practice, sent money back
to help provide for families they left behind .... Presumably,
many of those immigrants will want to continue to provide for
their families by will. Others, however, may die intestate, leaving
property to be disbursed to remaining nonresident relatives. In
both cases, the Iron Curtain statutes pose formidable obstacles.1 8
Moreover, as these immigrants become more active in pursuing their
rights in American courts, such conflicts may create tensions in diplomacy
156. See Comment, supra note 57, at 321. Indeed, the courts have displayed
extraordinary disregard for the financial burden facing the nonresident alien claimant. For
example, after the Zschernig decision held reciprocity statutes unconstitutional, the courts
were deaf to the claims of aliens who had been deprived of their inheritances by similar
reciprocity statutes: In re Estate of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 72, 485 P.2d 785, 791, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 439 (1971) (The claimants presented no legal, physical or practical impossibility
or futility in appealing their prior decision because they were able to challenge the
constitutional soundness of its reasoning.); Hitcheva v. Division of State Lands, 31 Or. App.
839, 572 P.2d 625, 627 (1977) (Even though the court acknowledged the unconstitutionality
of the statute under which petitioner was denied her bequest, the court found that
"petitioner could have challenged the statute as was done in Zschernig."). Thus, the courts
would add the further financial burden on the nonresident petitioner to bring a suit
challenging the constitutionality of a statute. One critic of this judicial reasoning pointed
out in response that an attorney, reasonably competent, is entitled to rely on a judicial
opinion, in which a hearing by the court has been denied, and is entitled to consider that
the opinion correctly states the law. Hornan, 5 Cal. 3d at 81, 485 P.2d at 799, 95 Cal.
Rptr. at 447 (1971) (Peters, J., dissenting); see also text accompanying notes 152-54.
157. Comment, supra note 19, at 566. The new burden of proof standard directly
inhibits the "basic responsibilit[ies] of the probate judge and of the administrator to make
every reasonable effort to assure that a decedent's estate is properly distributed among his
heirs." In re DeSautels, 1 Mass. App. 787, 307 N.E.2d 576, 580 (Mass. App. 1974).
"Fiduciaries and the courts, which have authority over them and to which they are
accountable, are under an obligation to carry out the direction of the testator or settlor, or
the legal direction in the case of intestacy. Implicit in that obligation is the duty to deliver
monies belonging to such persons in foreign countries ..... Id. (quoting In re Estate of
Kish, 52 NJ. 454, 467, 246 A.2d 1, 8 (1968)).
158. Comment, supra note 11, at 643 (citation omitted).
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with the United States.159 These developments suggest that the con-
stitutionality of the Iron Curtain statutes should be reevaluated.
VIII. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ALIEN INHERITANCE STATUTES
The Supreme Court rarely has accepted a constitutional challenge to
alien inheritance statutes; moreover, the guidance provided by the few
existing court decisions indicates only that further guidance is necessary.
The first such challenge came in Clark v. Allen, 160 where the con-
stitutionality of the California reciprocity statute161 was attacked on the
grounds that the statute infringed upon the exclusive power of the federal
government over foreign affairs. 162 The Supreme Court rejected the
foreign affairs challenge as "farfetched."'6
In sustaining the constitutionality of the California statute, Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that devolution rights are
determined by state law in the absence of a contrary federal policy.164 As
to rights in personalty, there was no conflicting treaty requiring the state
law to yield in this case. 16 Moreover, the Court maintained that the
statute did not violate the proscriptions against a state negotiating or
making a compact with a foreign nation.' 66 In conclusion, the Court
stated: "What California has done will have some incidental or indirect
effect in foreign countries. But this is true of many state laws which
none would claim cross the forbidden line." 67
The rationale employed by the Court in Clark is clearly open to
objection. Not only did the Court grossly underestimate the effect of the
California statute on foreign relations, but the Court also failed to
address the statement of urgency' 68 contained in the statute, upon which
the trial court, holding for the alien claimant, 169 had based its decision.170
The statement of urgency attempted to justify immediate application of
California's reciprocity statute due to the threat of foreign governments
159. Id at 644.
160. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
161. For the text of this statute, see supra note 44.
162. Clark, 331 U.S. 503 at 516.
163. Id at 516-17.
164. Id at 517.
165. Id
166. Id
167. Id
168. For the text of this statement, see supra note 44.
169. Crowley v. Allen, 52 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
170. Note, supra note 111, at 610.
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seizing American estate assets from the nonresident alien beneficiaries
and using the money for "war purposes. ' 171 "The foreign governments
guilty of these practices," the statement read, "constitute a direct threat
to the Government of the United States . . ."17 By holding that such
a statement does not cross the "forbidden line" of formulating foreign
policy, the Court virtually ignored the strong language of the statement
evincing a contrary intent. The Court did suggest, however, at least by
implication, that a due process argument might have merited closer
scrutiny than did the foreign relations argument.1n,
Later, in Ioannou v. New York, 74 the Court rejected an opportunity
to reexamine Clark for want of a substantial federal question.175 "Justice
Douglas dissented in the decision to deny certiorari, indicating that his
opinion had changed since Clark and that he might possibly endorse a
broader use of the federal foreign affairs power as a preemptive
doctrine."176 Justice Douglas argued that the constitutionality of the New
York benefit, use and control statute was in doubt because it raised
issues of whether it "impair[ed] the effective exercise of the Nation's
foreign policy," and whether there was a "persistent and subtle effect" on
international relations. 17 Furthermore, he suggested a third reason why
the statute might be void on its face: "If New York's purpose is to
preclude unfriendly foreign governments from obtaining funds that will
assist their efforts hostile to this Nation's interests . . . it seemingly is an
attempt to regulate foreign affairs."1 78  Justice Douglas thus found
relevant the three concerns he summarily had dismissed before.
179
Twenty-one years later, Justice Douglas took advantage of the
opportunity to express his expanded views on the foreign affairs doctrine.
In Zschemig v. Miller, the Oregon inheritance statute, which conditioned
the right to inherit on both reciprocity and benefit, use and control was
attacked as an unconstitutional intrusion into foreign affairs.180 Justice
171. See supra note 44.
172. Id
173. Id
174. 371 U.S. 30 (1962) (per curiam).
175. Id.
176. See Comment, supra note 11, at 669.
177. Ioannou, 371 U.S. at 32 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 34.
179. Comment, supra note 11, at 669-70.
180. OtE. REv. STAT. § 111.070, repealed in 1969, contained provisions similar to the
now existing California reciprocity and New York benefit, use and control statutes. It read:
(1) The right of an alien not residing within the United Sates or its
territories to take either real or personal property or the proceeds
thereof in this state by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the
same terms and conditions as inhabitants and citizens of the United
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Douglas began by attempting to distinguish Zschernig from Clark:
We were [in Clark] concerned with the words of a statue on its
face, not the manner of its application.... At the time Clark v.
Allen was decided, the case seemed to involve no more than a
routine reading of foreign laws. It now appears that in this
reciprocity area under inheritance statutes, the probate courts of
the various States have launched inquiries into the type of
governments that obtain in particular foreign nations .... "181
Each of the provisions of the Oregon statute in question was found
unconstitutional as an intrusion into the field of foreign affairs tradition-
ally reserved for the federal government. The entire statute, therefore,
was held unconstitutional as applied (but not on its face), and Clark was
not reconsidered. The Court stated, in effect, that such statutes may be
constitutional provided they involve only a "routine reading of foreign
laws." Realistically, however, such a guideline provides little guidance:
[Plrobate courts cannot effectively guarantee that "reciprocity"
or "benefit, use and control" exist in fact in a foreign country
unless they look behind the words of that country's laws and into
the actual application of those laws. Yet that is exactly what
they are forbidden to do by Zschernig. If the courts investigate
the actual administration of a foreign legal system they risk
States, is dependent in each case:
(a) Upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of
citizens of the United States to take real and personal
property and the proceeds thereof upon the same terms and
conditions as inhabitants and citizens of the country of which
such alien is an inhabitant or citizen;
(b) Upon the rights of citizens of the United States to receive by
payment to them within the United States or its territories
money originating from estates of persons dying within such
foreign country; and
(c) Upon proof that such foreign heirs, distributees, devisees or
legatees may receive the benefit, use or control of money or
property from estates of persons dying in this state without
confiscation, in whole or in part, by the governments of such
foreign countries.
(2) The burden is upon such nonresident alien to establish the fact of
existence of the reciprocal rights set forth in subsection (1) of this
section.
(3) If such reciprocal rights are not found to exist, and if no heir, devisee
or legatee other than such alien is found eligible to take such property,
the property shall be disposed of as escheated property.
Quoted in Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430 n.1.
181. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433-34. The types of inquiries referred to included looking
into the motives of foreign governments or foreign official statements and the actual
administration of foreign laws. Id
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reversal; if they do not, they risk noncompliance with the
provisions of their state's inheritance statute. The alternatives
appear to be either to permit the courts to examine the ad-
ministration of foreign laws or to declare such inheritance
statutes themselves incapable of proper administration and
unconstitutional on their face.18
Thus, the Court failed to define clearly the scope of the new foreign
affairs preemptive doctrine. This uncertainty has "resulted in weak
guidance for the lower courts in interpreting and applying Zschemig."
183
The Court, unfortunately, has not reconsidered the issue.
IX. ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF DEALING WITH ALIEN INHERITANCE
Given the level of uncertainty and unfairness concerning alien
inheritance, even after two Supreme Court decisions, the time clearly is
overdue for a national standard of regulation, implemented by Congress.
The prospects for state initiative are far from promising. Indeed, "Itihe
very nature of a state legislature makes such action improbable unless
strong public opinion or the influence of an active and articulate pressure
group is brought to bear."'8 Not surprisingly, little visible sign of public
182. Note, supra note 111, at 612.
183. Comment, supra note 11, at 670 (citation omitted); see eg., In re Johnston, 16 N.C.
App. 38, 190 S.E.2d 879, 882 (1972) (statute providing that right of nonresident aliens to
inherit property is dependent upon reciprocity is constitutional on its face). "We recognize
that the United States Supreme Court has held that an Oregon statute, similar to ours,
was unconstitutionally applied, but this does not destroy the validity of the provisions
themselves .... It seems that the unconstitutional application arose from Oregon's inter-
pretation of the quantum of proof required to establish reciprocity." Id (citation omitted).
Thus, here the Court of Appeals of North Carolina believes the Zschernig decision is
inapplicable, because "except for the reciprocity provisions . . .a nonresident alien is
entitled to inherit by intestate succession as fully as a resident alien or a citizen of this
country." Id This reasoning, however, is faulty: the burden of proving the existence of
reciprocity is upon the foreign claimant. The court will not likely take whatever the
claimant profers as gospel; in fact, numerous cases abound where the court disputes the
evidence presented by the nonresident alien. Yet if the court examines the evidence for
validity, it is engaging in the type of activity prohibited by Zschemig. Such conduct,
moreover, has the potential to affect international relations in a "subtle" way. Zschernig,
389 U.S. at 429 (1968); see also Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F.Supp. 1321 (D. Neb. 1971)
(reciprocity statute would not be unconstitutional on its face but would become so only if
it was applied in such a manner as to intrude upon the foreign affairs of the United States);
In re Estate of Kolodij, 85 Misc. 2d 946, 380 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (given totalitarian
form of government, statute requires showing by alien beneficiary that benefit, use or
control of property at issue would not be denied to her); In re Estate of Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d
346, 239 N.E.2d 550, 292 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1968) (impounding of funds of distributee of estate,
a resident of Soviet Union, under statute relating to deposit in court for benefit of legatee,
distributee or beneficiary, is not unconstitutional).
184. Sullivan, supra note 33, at 45.
1989]
N.Y.L. ScH. J. INTL & COMp. L
concern exists over the rights of nonresident alien beneficiaries. "Against
the dead weight of legislative indifference, there is little cause to believe
that an effective repeal movement is likely to develop. About the most
that may reasonably be expected is occasional repeal of an alienage
restriction during the work of code commissions or revisors of statutes."'1
This method, however, is too uncertain and too sporadic to be effective.
Corrective national legislation is by far the best solution to this
confusion and inequity. The new legislation would establish a uniform
means of disallowing inheritance in those instances where it is in the best
interest of the national welfare to do so. Congress would remove
alienage as a disability and grant to all nonresident aliens the right to
succeed to property in the United States, except when the executive
branch of the government moves to block the transmission of estate
assets abroad. 18 The executive branch would exercise this right when it
would be in the national interest to do so.181 The legislation would thus
force states to comply with several critical limitations, chiefly that they
refrain from interfering with the foreign affairs powers of the federal
government. Nor would national legislation violate existing judicial
restraints: the new legislation would meet the test employed in Clark
(no more than an incidental or indirect effect on foreign countries) and
in Zschernig (must be no more than a routine reading of foreign law).'M
Indeed, there would be no reading of foreign law; the executive branch
would retain the responsibility for performing this task.
Most of the goals of the reciprocity and benefit, use and control
statutes were improper state purposes; however, such policy considerations
clearly are legitimate interests of uniform national control. For example,
preventing assets in the United States from falling into the hands of
unfriendly nations is clearly a federal problem.189 Bringing about policies
in foreign nations which would permit United States citizens to inherit
property in those nations has been a policy more properly reserved to the
federal or central government since the development of early common
law.190
Because a comprehensive program is preferable to a limited one,
Supreme Court review is urged. Understandably, Congress might be
reluctant to legislate in an area traditionally belonging to the states.
Thus, until Congress so legislates, an informative judicial precedent would
185. Id
186. Boyd, supra note 26, at 510-11.
187. Id at 510.
188. Comment, supra note 19, at 566.
189. Id at 567.
190. Id
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be useful. The Supreme Court traditionally has been willing to interpret
the Constitution in light of changing circumstances. Therefore, the Court
should take the small step from Zschemig and declare all state statutes
regulating alien inheritance unconstitutional on their face.191 Court deter-
mination, of course, neither should preclude nor delay congressional
activity.
If the Court is unwilling to take even that "small step," then certain
procedural measures should be adopted. For example, it is more
equitable to place the burden of proof on the person attacking the
distribution to show a factual likelihood of confiscation or lack of
reciprocity. 192 The presumption should be in favor of the claimant rather
than against him, and the contesting party should be required to show
specific instances where confiscation or lack of reciprocity took place. 193
Indeed, it might be most favorable not to have foreign law be an issue
of fact at all. Instead, in each instance, courts should refrain from
making a determination regarding reciprocity or benefit, use or control
without an official expression of the views of the state department on the
matter. Finally, a better measure of value of the dollar in the alien
claimant's country may be in terms of the income of the average citizen,
because the money received would better reflect an improvement in living
conditions.19
An alternative solution would be for citizens to avoid probate
altogether. For example, with land, probate may be avoided by forming
a corporation to hold title to the real estate. 19  Unfortunately, the
circumstances of a particular investment may not favor the corporate
form of ownership, and where recreational real estate is involved, this
vehicle may be too cumbersome.196 Bank accounts would pose the least
problem in avoiding probate administration, while tangible personal
property and securities physically located within the United States pose
the greatest problems. 19 Clearly, this solution is advised only if all other
forms of amelioration -national legislation, Supreme Court declaration
of unconstitutionality and procedural amendments -fail.
191. Note, supra note 111, at 622.
192. Id at 603.
193. Id at 603-04.
194. See Comment, supra note 11, at 654 n.63.
195. See Note, Rights and Restrictions on Interests of Aliens in U.S. Estates: Federal and
State Laws Affecting Administration and Distribution of US. Estates in which Aliens Hold
Interests, 15 RE-AL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 659, 661 (1980).
196. Id
197. Id
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X. CONCLUSION
Today, approximately a dozen states retain their "Iron Curtain"
restrictions, despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Zschemig in 1968.19
While these statutes have generated few court contests in recent years,
the number of aliens denied their rightful inheritance doubtlessly occurs
more frequently. Unfavorable precedent, together with the cost of such
contests, provides ample deterrence to the nonresident who wishes to
challenge escheat. Even if this "hidden" group of denied beneficiaries
did not exist, the possibility that any nonresident beneficiary of an
American decedent may be deprived of their rightful inheritance
mandates a solution.
Past constitutional challenges to the Iron Curtain statutes have had
limited success because courts have not been sympathetic to legal and
moral arguments made on behalf of communist, nonresident aliens.'99
Alternative approaches are warranted, such as national legislat;on and
further Supreme Court treatment, including an alternate equal protection
perspective that focuses on the decedent's right to devise property and
thus avoids the nondomiciliary problems of the nonresident alien. Should
these approaches be taken, the result in each case will delend not upon
the chance location of property, but rather upon fundamental principles
of fairness and justice.
Jamie Beth Hakman
198. 390 U.S. 974 (1968).
199. Comment, supra note 11, at 689.
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